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The U.S. Merchant Marine is at a crossroads; it must be rebuilt and
modernized or it will die. The urgency of the situation was forcibly
brought out in a recent statement by Andrew E. Gibson, the Maritime
Administrator, in which he said, "We are three or four years away from
disaster.
"
That the present status of our Merchant Marine is one of decadence is
of little doubt. In the U.S. flag fleet, 80 per cent of our ships are over
220 years old and within the next four to five years most of these will be
r>
scrapped. Thus, if new financing and increased shipbuilding are not soon
forthcoming, our American flag merchant fleet will all but disappear from
the seas by 1980.
This situation did not develop over night nor can it be attributed
to any one particular cause. Unhappily, because there are multiple causes
behind the current problems, the solutions are necessarily complex. Further,
those who would provide help and participate in the remedial efforts do not
speak with one voice. There are, in fact, many contending and contentious
factions in our society, each vying for its own slice of the pie and pro-
tecting its own special interests. These various interest groups either
loudly praise or vehemently damn the Merchant Marine, depending upon the
perspective of the commentator; none of whom is dispassionate. To some, the
current state of affairs is the fault of the ship owners and operators,
•^-Miriam Ottenberg, "Crisis at Sea," The Washington Star , August 3,
1969, P. Al.
2Admiral T.H. Moorer, USN, CNO, "Remarks Before the VFW National
Convention," Philadelphia, Pa., August 19, 1969, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)
^U.S. President, Message to the Congress, "Merchant Marine Program",
Press Release
,




while others believe the blame variously belongs to the shipbuilders, the
Government j unions, shifting trade patterns or an apathetic American Public.
For years, while the various factions were all agreed that our
commercial shipping industry was dying and were freely passing out blame,
there was no concensus that a distinctly American Merchant Marine was an
asset or a national necessity,. Consequently, there was no agreement that the
industry which we had in being should be perpetuated. The case for or
against a U.S. flag capability has been argued at length over the past two
decades, but it now seems that the day has been carried by those who would
see us continue in world wide oceanic commercial trade. Despite some con-
tinuing and rather vehement opposition,-"- there is now wide agreement that an
American Merchant Marine of considerable size and vigor definitely is an
asset and its operation is in the national interest. The Administration,
Congress, the various segments of the industry, and indeed, the public, have
closed ranks in support of the concept of a new, modern and vigorous Merchant
7Marine.
However, this new found wealth of support does not solve the basic
problems which have traditionally plagued U.S. flag commercial carriers;
high building and operating 'costs, and disruptive and costly labor practices.
Nor does it mean that those who support the concept and ultimate goals are in
agreement as to the methods and means which should be employed to achieve
these ends. One point of agreement between all factions is that the Govern-
ment holds the key position, and that its policies and actions will determine
the shape and direction of the future.
•-Leonard A. Rapping, "Testimony Before the Joint Economic Committee,
Subcommittee on Economy in Government," Washington, D.C., September 24,
1969. (Mimeographed.)
2"U.S. Shipping Steers Back into the Money," Business Week
,
December 13, 1969, p. 57.

Most Government support has traditionally taken the form of sub-
sidies, supplemented by certain other economic benefits and special priv-
iliges. It is the purpose of this paper to review Government support over
the recent past, and to attempt to gauge the degree to which it has met its
objectives. The paper also analyzes the industry's efforts at self help and
the Government support proposed for the next decade. The comprehensive new
program, announced by the President on October 23, 1969, is used as the basis
for comment on future Government support.
Chapter II provides background, and places the present problems in
perspective, by briefly outlining our merchant shipping history and reviewing
the current status of the Merchant Marine. It also compares our current
capability with that of other major maritime nations and discusses the role
of the Merchant Marine in national security. This is done to put Government
support in context and to provide an information data base. The paper
assumes that the argument over the need for a U.S. flag fleet has been
settled in favor of maintaining this capability.
Chapter III reviews the basic support legislation and discusses the
objectives of the various acts. It then analyzes the specific financial
supports provided for in the legislation and the effectiveness of each of
these support programs.
Chapter IV reviews and analyzes the new programs undertaken by the
industry itself and discusses their prospects for success. It also reviews
the new maritime program enunciated by the President and discusses the
options which are open to the Government.
Chapter V summarizes Chapters I through IV and draws conclusions as to




Before discussing the specifics of the various Government support
programs and their effect upon the Merchant Marine, it is considered neces-
sary that a framework be provided within which to judge the effectiveness of
the support which has been furnished. This frame of reference will be
established by a brief review of our merchant history, a comparison of our
current capability with that of other major maritime powers, and a discussion
of the role of the Merchant Marine in national security.
HISTORICAL REVIEW
The European related history of North America has always been a child
and a creation of the sea. whether you believe the Vinland legend-'- or the
less controversial story of Columbus, there is no doubt that the discoverers
of this new land came by sea. At first, the history of this strange con-
tinent was really the log of the maritime daring of the peoples of Europe,
and the story of the ships and sailors who were the vanguard of its civil-
ization. After the adventurers and discoverers came the colonists and early
settlers, and ultimately, great waves of immigrants, all by sea, generally in
decrepit ships of questionable lineage and seaworthiness.
The first ship of any size constructed in America was the 30 ton
2VIRGINIA, built in what is now Maine in 1607. Throughout the colonial
period the shipbuilding and trading skills of the colonists rapidly in-
creased, and Yankee ships became familiar sights in many world ports. The
Government did nothing to aid ocean commerce, in fact, restrictive maritime
acts imposed by Parliament, in a vain attempt to control these seagoing
R. A. Skelton, "The Mapping of Vinland," American Heritage Magazine
,
October 1965, pp. 9 and 10.
Howard I. Chapelle, The History of American Sailing Ships
,
(New
York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc., 1935), p. 6.

horsetraders, contributed significantly to the unrest leading to revolu-
tion.
The Revolutionary War saw the virtual destruction of the American
merchant fleet, as the British swept our trade from the seas. However, the
importance of commercial shipping was not lost on the new country and
immediately after the war it passed the first legislation designed to aid
the shipping industry. In 1789, a law was enacted which provided that in
order to have American registry, a ship had to be owned by a United States
citizen and have been built in this country. The Congress further provided
benefits to U.S. ship owners and operators by imposing lower import duties
and customs on items which were carried in American registry ships.
On the heels of our own revolution came that of the French, and then
Napoleon and a world war. The entire era of the Napoleonic struggles was
one of increasing restriction on American commerce, including a self imposed
embargo, culminating in the War of 1812. Again, as in the Revolution, our
transoceanic and coastal shipping were completely decimated.
The wars of the latter part of the eighteenth and the early nine-
teenth centuries forced the American shipbuilder and trader to improve his
ship design, as well as his commercial skills, for speed might be his only
salvation in meeting with an enemy brig or frigate. These lessons, well
learned in war, were applied immediately to the drive for commercial
supremacy at sea when hostilities ceased. .In this period, the great China
and Spice Islands trades were opened and the United States entered upon the
world scene as a maritime nation of considerable consequence. As the mid-
nineteenth century approached, not only were U.S. ships carrying most of our
own trade but they were also carrying a good percentage of the trade of many
••-Paul M. Zeis, American Shipping Policy
,
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1938), pp. 1-3.

other nations. This was the period of American commercial shipping mastery,
the age of the clipper ships; " the most beautiful creations of man in
America. These were our Gothic cathedrals, our Parthenon; but monuments
carved from snow. For a few brief years they flashed their splendor around
the world then disappeared with the finality of the wild pidgeon." Un-
fortunately, this position of preeminence was truly fleeting, its passing
caused by the effects of the Civil War and a reluctance to switch to steam.
By the 1870s, the position had changed so drastically that U S. flag ships
were carrying less than 40 per cent of our foreign commerce as compared to
90 per cent in the 1840s. The merchant fleet continued to decline, and by
the time World War I started its share of U.S„ seaborne trade was less than
2
10 per cent.
World War I precipitated a major shipping crisis because the U.S
could not move its own commerce, and the ships of other countries were not
available to pick up the slack. President Wilson, in his Third Annual
Message to Congress in May 1915 stated, "It is high time we repaired our mis-
3take and resumed our commercial independence on the seas." A number of
measures were taken, the most important of which was a major building pro-
grara. This program produced hundreds of ships but they were completed too
late to be of significant help in the war effort. As a consequence, the
United States found itself saddled with a merchant fleet far in excess of its
peacetime needs. Most of the wartime construction rapidly found its way into
ship graveyards or the wrecker's yard to be broken up for scrap.
Samuel E. Mori son, The Oxford History of the American People
,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 584.
^U.S. Maritime Commission, Handbook of Merchant Marine Developmen t
and Regulation in the United States
,
(Washington, D.C: Government Printing
Office, 1940), p. 177.
-^Committee of American Steamship Lines, The American Merchant Marine
,
Hero in War - Stepchild in Peace
,





The fat-in-war, lean-in-peace cycle has continued ever since. The
number of ships steadily declined until World War II, when another massive
building effort began. After the war, the ships went up many of the country's
rivers to be mothballed and tied together in huge rafts, to sit and wait for
the next crisis. It came, in the form of the Korean War, but again the
crisis ebbed, only to return and dominate the 1960s by requiring a major
support effort in Southeast Asia.
CURRENT CAPABILITY
According to the latest official figures, dated December 31, 1968, the
total U.S. Merchant Marine is comprised of 2071 ships, of which only 9o7 are
privately owned, the remainder being Government owned, with 932 of these non-
operational in the Reserve Fleet, and the other 172 in custody of, or under
charter to, the various federal departments. In the privately owned segment
of the fleet, approximately one- third are directly subsidized in one way or
another. The merchant fleet carries only 4 8 per cent of our international
commercial cargo trade although 99 per cent of this trade, by tonnage, moves
by sea. Table I below, shows the fluctuations in the size of the U<,S„ flag
fleet over the past several years and also depicts the per cent of U.S. inter-
national cargo moving in these ships. By law, all of our domestic seaborne
commerce and Great Lakes cargo moves in American registry shipping.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Merchant Fleets
of the World
,
(Washington, D,C„: UoS. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 13.
~
ZVADM L c P. Ramage, USN, Commander MSTS, "Remarks Before the New York
Yacht Club," New York, May 15,. 1969, p. 9. (Mimeographed.)

TABLE I
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. FOREIGN TRADE
TONNAGE CARRIED IN U.S. FLAG FLEET
AND
NUMBER OF ACTIVE SHIPS IN THIS FLEET,
1950 TO 1968







Source: Data in this table has been derived from a wide variety of Maritime
Administration statistical sources and has been synthesized and
combined for relevant presentation.
In the following table, the composition of the active U.S„ fleet as of
December 31, 1968, is displayed:
TABLE II
ACTIVE U.S. MERCHANT FLEET, 1968
(1000 GROSS TONS AND OVER)
TYPE OF SHIP NUMBER OF SKIPS DEADWEIGHT TONS (MILLIONS)
Combination Pa ssenger 26 .23
and Cargo
Freighters 784 8.96
Bulk Carriers 50 .98
Tankers 279 6.96
Total all Ships 1139 17.13
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, U.S., Merchant




The figures of Table I emphatically portray the fact that we are
again, as pointed out by President Wilson in 1915, a commercially dependant
nation. We are the world's greatest trading nation, and yet can not come
close to meeting our own transportation requirements at sea.
By contrast the Soviet Union currently carries 50 per cent of its own
seaborne commerce and it is projected that, by 1975, the figure will have
risen to not less than 75 per cent.
The projected major increase in the size and carrying capacity of the
Soviet merchant fleet is no accident, for it is their goal to' be free from
reliance on foreign shipping. Their published statements and plans indicate
that they are going to develop the largest merchant fleet in the world; "In
the words of Mikhail Bakayev, USSR, Minister of the Merchant Marine, 'to
gain control of the seas.' More explicitly, Soviet maritime goals have been
defined as
:
(1) To free the USSR from reliance on foreign-flag ships;
(2) To exert a decisive influence on the world level of maritime
freight rates;
o
(3) To become a major carrier of the commerce of other nations. 1
In order to make these dramatic gains the Soviets have been engaged in
a major shipbuilding program for over two decades. In the period 1950 to
1968, the Soviet merchant marine took delivery of approximately 10 million
tons of shipping capacity, increasing the fleet from 432 ships to its current
3total of 1,634. Table III, below, presents a summary of the ships under
^Ottenberg, "Crisis at Sea," Washington Star
,
August 3, 1969, p. Al
.
2U.S., Congress, House, The Soviets and the Seas , H. Rept. 1809, 89th
Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, p„ 21«
-'Edwin M. Hood, President, Shipbuilders Council of America, The
Growing Spectre of the Soviet Union on the High Seas
,
(Washington, D.C.:
Shipbuilders Council of America, 1967), p. 5., and MARAD data.
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construction or on order for both the U.S„ and the Soviets for the seven year
period 1962 through 1968.
TABLE III
SHIPS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER FOR THE U . S „ AND USSR, 1962-1968



















Source: Shipbuilders Council of America, Annual Report, 1968
,
(Washington,
D.C.: Shipbuilders Council of America, 1969), p. 4.
Although these ships and tonnages do not represent actual increases in
fleet size and capacity in eacb year, they do show the level of construction
activity related to the merchant marine in each country. Over the past
several years, actual new ship deliveries to the Soviet merchant fleet have
outpaced deliveries to the U S. flag fleet by a ratio of 8 to 1. In 1965,
for example, 129 ships were delivered to the Russian fleet while only 16 were
added to the American fleet. The 458 ships under construction or on order
for the Soviet Union, in 1968, represent approximately 24 per cent of the
total number of ships under construction or on order for all the maritime
nations of the world for that year.





Another means of comparison is the amount of capital spent by each
country for ship construction. The Soviet Union spent the equivalent of $600
million in building ships for its merchant marine in 1968; the U.S. spent $150
million. This is not the full story either, for it costs the U S at least
1tv;ice as much as it costs the Soviets to build each ship.
The following tables show the comparative rankings of the several
leading maritime nations, based on registration, and the relationship of the
size of the U.S. merchant fleet to the overall world merchant fleet. Two
significant things must be borne in mind when using these tables. First, the
U.S. fleet, as it is displayed, is composed of two parts, the privately owned
segment, which is the primary concern of this paper, and the Government owned
segment, controlled by MARAD. The Government owned, portion accounts for 53
per cent of the U.S. ship totals and 40 per cent of the tonnage. Of the
MARAD ships, over 80 per cent arc in mothballs and are useless short of a
major national emergency; and of the remainder, all but a handfull will be
taken out of active service by 1973 because of age and decrepit condition.
These MARAD ships, along with the many old and obsolete ships included in the
figure for the privately owned segment, tend to drastically distort the
actual relationship of the U'.S. capability to the rest of the world fleet.
Secondly, the figures for Liberia and Panama are inflated by the registration
of foreign owned and operated ships under these flags. The "flag of con-
venience" ships are owned by companies from many countries, with U.S. oper-
ators being active participants in this legal loophole which reduces operat-
ing costs, taxes, and Government regulation and control. In 1968, American-
owned shipping registered under foreign "flags of convenience" amounted to
VADM Ramage, "Remarks to N.Y. Yacht Club," p. 9.
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about. 16 million deadweight tons and this capacity must be given some con-
sideration when evaluating overall U.S. shipping capability.
TABLE IV
WORLD MERCHANT FLEET, 1968
(1000 GROSS TONS AND OVER)
RANK COUNTRY '% TOTAL DEADWEIGHT % TOTAL
(DWT) REGISTRATION SHIPS WORLD SHIPS TONS (MILLIONS) WORLD TONNAGE
1 LIBERIA 1,613 8.3 45.14 16.5
2 NORWAY 1,308 6.8 30.59 11.2
3 U.K. 1,840 9.5 29.92 11.0
4 JAPAN 1,766 9.1 29.22 10.7
5 U.S. 2,071 10.7 25.46 9.3
(PRIVATE) 967 5.0 15.35 5.6
(MARAD) 1,104 5.7 10.11 3.7
6 USSR 1,634 8.4 11.91 4.4
7 GREECE 1,006 5.2 11.54 4.2
8 FED. GERMANY 909 4.7 9.32 3.4
9 ITALY 620 3.2 8.69 3.2
10 PANAMA 623 3.2 8.01 2.9
- ALL OTHERS 5,971 30.9 63.41 23.2
TOTAL ALL COUNTRIES 19,361 100,0 273.21 100.0
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, World Merchant
Fleet
,




RELATION OF U.S. MERCHANT FLEET TONNAGE
TO WORLD MERCHANT FLEET TONNAGE, 1955 THROUGH 1968,
(SHIPS 1000 GROSS TONS AND OVER IN MILLIONS
OF DEADWEIGHT TONS)
















Source: U.S„ Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Wor ld Merchant
Fl ppf
,
(Washington, D.C.: Maritime Administration, 1969), p. 1.

l/l
In summary, the figures which show the U.S. solidly in fifth position
worldwide are misleading, for they include much capacity which is of little
real value. Conversely, the importance and the positive impact of "flag of
convenience" ships is not reflected. In any case, the 12.5 per cent growth
of U.S. private capacity from 13.6 million DWT in 1955 to 15.3 million DWT
in 1968, has not compensated for the loss of 11 million DWT of Government
owned capacity, nor has it kept pace with the 110 per cent growth experienced
by the world fleet, as a whole, over the same period. Based on the figures
-
in the above tables, it can be reasonably projected that the Soviet merchant
marine will surpass the U.S„ flag merchant fleet, both in numbers of snips
and tonnage capacity by 1972
„
NATIONAL SECURITY ROLE
During his campaign for the presidency, Richard Nixon summarized the
role of seapower, he said: "Seapower is the ability of a nation to project
into the oceans, in times of peace, its economic strength; in times of
2
emergency, its defensive mobility." Mahan has more explicitly delineated
the role and position of the merchant marine within this definition by stat-
ing; "Seapower in the broad sense includes not only the military strength
afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the
peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally
o
and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests."
The national security roles for a merchant marine are not based only
in presidential rhetoric or in the theoretical concepts of a maritime strat-
egist, but for this country at least, they are grounded in the hard cold facts
of historical reality.
'•Ibid.
, p . 1
.
2VADM Ramage, "Remarks to N.Y. Yacht Club," p. 3.
^Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History
,
(New York:
Sagamore Press Inc., 1957), p. 25.
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The interdependence of the naval and merchant anus of seapower started
early in our national history, when our first naval ships were merchant ships
•converted to this role. In addition, many other merchant ships were armed and
sailed as privateers to prey on enemy ocean commerce. This capability, for
merchant ships to play a dual role, continued through the Civil War period but
was drastically reduced thereafter by the introduction of armor plate and
armor piercing ammunition to the naval arsenal. A few armed merchant cruisers
and disguised Q-boats took part in both World Wars I and II, but their only
real effect was to add a touch of romantiscism to the otherwise conventional
and businesslike war at sea.
Of course, the most important contribution of the Merchant Marine has
been its inherent capability to move men and material. As the world, and
therefore warfare, have become more complex, the size of armies and the
amounts of equipment needed to support each man has grown. Our merchant
fleet has traditionally been called upon to support overseas military require-
ments, from our initial expedition to Nassau in 1776 to Vietnam today, while
maintaining the capability to meet the needs of the national economy. It met
these dual responsibilities very well until the latter half of the nineteenth
century, at which time our entire seapower structure, merchant and naval, went
into eclipse.
The first inkling, as to how far we had fallen in our ability to meet
our national commitments, came during the Spanish -American War. The United
States could not move its forces to Cuba in its own shipping, and had to buy
or charter foreign ships to meet the emergency. This, however, was just a
forerunner of an even worse situation which would develop seventeen years
later with the outbreak of World War I.
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We could not handle our own seaborne commerce, and with the outbreak
of war, the foreign maritime nations withheld their ships. As an example of
the disastrous result, this country exported 257,172 bales of cotton in
August, 1913, one year later in August, 1914, only 21,219 bales were exported.
"Before World I, ships were chartered for $1 a ton. Two short months after
the outbreak, the charter rate was $13.88 a ton to areas outside the war zone,
$20 to $21 to war zones - in 1914 dollars. In fact, shipping profits were so
high that many ships were completely paid for from the profit of one voyage.
The demand for ships also rose with sales prices climbing from $60 a ton to
$300 a ton." 2
The demand for capability was met by paying exhorbitant freight and
charter rates, confiscating and buying foreign ships, and by a belated build-
ing program, but the price was high and the waste great. Only the absolute
necessity for a merchant marine to support our economy and its essentiality
to the prosecution of the war effort could have made the price acceptable.
Again, as the world drifted toward World War II, our merchant capa-
bility became critical. There were not enough ships this time either, but we
were better prepared, with an accelerated building program, inadequate though
it proved to be, already begun. However, the enemy was more dangerous and
the stakes were higher, because now the very existance and survival of our
Allies as nations, depended on the ability to move cargo across the Atlantic.
With this began the most prolonged, vicious, and all pervading battle of the
war; the Battle of the Atlantic. In the words of Winston Churchill: "The
Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war. Never
for one moment could we forget that everything happening' elsewhere, on land,







at sea, or in the air, depended ultimately on its outcome, and amid all other
cares we viewed its changing fortunes day by day with hope or apprehension."
At the end of the long and bitter struggle, between Pearl Harbor and
November 30, 1945, the Merchant Marine had moved over 268 million long tons
of material as well as 7 million troops and 141,000 civilians overseas, and
had returned 4 million troops and 169,000 civilians to the United States.
Then came Korea, and each soldier required 5 tons of initial supplies
and an additional 65 pounds of supplies and equipment daily to sustain him.
Five million passengers, 22 million tons of petroleum products, and 52
million tons of dry cargo were transported to, from and within the combat
theater; most of it by the Merchant Marine.
And now Vietnam. About 98 per cent of all the weapons and cargo for
the U.S., the Vietnamese, and our Allies, have been moved by sealift. In
1968, 1.1 million measurement tons of dry cargo moved to Vietnam each month
by sea; an average of 38,000 tons a day. Also, 18 million barrels of petro-
leum products were sealifted each month in 1968, a large percentage of it
being necessary to refuel aircraft used in the airlift of high priority cargo
4
and troops to and from the theater. In addition to the bulk cargo, sealift
has also delivered about 300,000 troops to the combat theater.
But the necessity to respond to crisis is not the whole story. Today
the U.S. must import 66 of tbe 77 strategic raw materials and critical com-
modities necessary to keep our economy functioning. These materials, because
of their bulk, move 99 per cent by sea and the U.S„ has the capability to
move much less than 5 per cent of the required total. Table VI, below,
'-Winston S. Churchi]l, The Second World War, Vol V: Closing the Ring
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1951), p. 6.





. , p . 30
.
^VADM Ramage, "Remarks to the N C Y. Yacht Club," p. 7.
5 Ibid
.




shows those raw materials, of which, 75 per cent or more of the normal re-
quirement must be imported.
TABLE VI
ESSENTIAL RAW MATERIALS REQUIRING
75 PER CENT OR MORE IMPORTS
ITEM PER CENT IMPORTED
NATURAL RUBBER 100
TIN 100











Source: U.S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Military Sea
Transportat ion Service
,
(Washington, D.C : Government Printing
Office, 1962), p. 5.
In addition to the obvious requirement for tin, asbestos, and manganese,




Finally, the operation of a U.S„ Hag merchant fleet directly effects
the U.S international balance of payments. If the goods which are shipped
in the American Merchant Marine were shipped in foreign ships, a loss in the
amount of those charges would be sustained by the transportation section of
the U.S. balance of payments accounts.
During the ten year period between 1957 and 1966, the United States
experienced a total deficit of approximately $23 billion in its balance of
payments. For the same ten year period, the balance of payments impact of
all U.S. merchant shipping operations, including the operations of foreign
vessels chartered to U.S. companies, was a net gain of $5.7 billion. Further-
more, it is likely that had the same volume of trade been handled by an
entirely U.S„ flag fleet, the favorable impact would have been increased to
$7.3 billion. 1
In addition to the obvious increase in the net balance of payments
deficit, which would have occurred had there been no American Merchant
Marine to carry our trade; it is interesting to speculate upon the effect of
a U.S. flag fleet capable of carrying 50 per cent of our commerce instead of
the 10 per cent or less average capability experienced over the period in
question. If all the conditions upon which the Harbridge House study was
based, hold true linearly as the capacity of the fleet increases; an in-
crease in U.S. trade carried in U.S. ships from 10 per cent to 50 per cent
would result in an additional $24 billion favorable impact on the balance of
payments. The $23 billion deficit actually experienced would be wiped out.
This is probably much too good to be true, but it is indicative of the tre-
mendous impact which the Merchant Marine has upon this aspect of our national
financial position.
Harbridge House Inc. , The Balance of Payments and the U.S. Merchant
Marine, (Boston: Harbridge House Inc., 1968), p. 7.
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Thus, the Merchant Marine is historically and inextricably woven into
our national economic fabric. It has been proved to be a necessary element
of our national power and we have had to pay dearly when its capability has
been allowed to deteriorate. And finally, recent trends and the current
position of the fleet indicate continued decadence and loss of position re-




The United States, early in its national life, acknowledged the
.importance of seaborne trade and the necessity for a nation to be able to
carry a significant portion of this commerce in its own shipping. The Act of
1789 recognized this, and provided benefits to the ship operators, in the
form of reduced customs, and also protected the small but growing shipbuild-
ing industry by requiring American construction for U.S. flag registry.
This simple and relatively modest aid was all that was needed, in the
way of Government support, to stimulate the exciting period of growth which
culminated in the 1850s with the golden age of the clippership. The growth
and leadership were not dependent, however, in any significant measure upon
this Government support and aid. In the words of Nicholas Johnson, Maritime
Administrator from 1964 to 1966, "It is extremely important for us to re-
member that technical advances were responsible for the 'golden era' that
American merchant shipping enjoyed in the mid-nineteenth century.' The men
who owned and sailed our ships were constantly searching for - and finding -
new and better ways of doing things. Our shipbuilding techniques were
excellent and the high-speed clippers pioneered a wholly new concept of
transportation economics. The decline of this pioneering spirit and the
feeling that steam and steel were merely strange toys, had a lot to do with
the decline of our shipping prosperity."
The ravages of the Civil War and the almost total rejection of the use
of steam and steel took their toll and, except for the coastal trade, the U.S.
merchant fleet all but disappeared from the seas for the next fifty years.
In this period of technical stagnation and decline, the Government attempted
Nicholas Johnson, "The State or Our Merchant Marine," Naval Review,





several times to use mail contracts as a means of subsidizing and upgrading
our capability. Unfortunately, the attempts were half-hearted and fragmented;
but more importantly, even had they been well conceived and coordinated,
there was not the drive, spirit, or vision available in the industry to kindle
the rebirth of competitive operations.
And so, the United States drifted on toward World War I, and a major
shipping crisis, with no coordinated program and no sense of direction.
During the decade preceding the war, there was a growing realization that
something had to be done, and a number of legislative and executive committees
and commissions studied the problem. In the end, however, it was the war
itself which pushed the Government permanently into the shipping business;
which led in turn to the wide-ranging controls and support which are in effect
today.
THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1916 1
This Act was designed primarily to meet the shipping crisis precipi-
tated by the war. It established a Shipping Board, consisting of five members,
as a permanent independent agency with wide powers of investigation, regula-
tion and administration. This placed the Government firmly and inextricably
in the business of control and administration of the nation's ocean commerce
and its merchant marine.
It further, against some opposition, authorized the Board to purchase,
construct, own and operate its own ships; this, in fact, created a federally
owned and operated merchant fleet. The Secretary of the Treasury was the
primary supporter of the Government fleet concept, for which he advanced
three main arguments; "first, that private capital would not be forthcoming
on reasonable terms; second, that by owning the vessels the government could
^J.S. Statutes at Large
,
Vol. 39, Part I, pp. 728-738.
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protect against avarice; and third, that since public investment was required
to support ship operations, title to the ships should reside with the public.
To these arguments President Wilson added a fourth, that Government owned
ships could be used in a positive program of foreign trade promotion."
After organization of the Shipping Board in 1917, the major ship
building program which the Act authorized was begun. By the time the program
was halted in 1922, over 2300 ships had been constructed by the Government at
a cost of $3 billion. Unfortunately, less than one-sixth of this construc-
tion had been completed by the war's end and the Government found itself
with a large commercial fleet and no background or experience in this type of
ship operation.
In summary, the Act, by establishing the Shipping Board and giving it
broad regulacory powers, made the Government a major participant in ocean
commerce. It also built the largest merchant fleet in the world, of which
more than half was Government owned.
It created some major problems as well, most pressing of which was;
what to do with the fleet now that it was in existance. In addition to
lacking operational experience, the Shipping Board was limited by the Act to
the duration of the war plus' five years, as the period in which it could own
and operate the ships. Further, the Act did not specify how, and under what
conditions, ships could be transferred from Government to private ownership,
nor did it indicate what was expected of the Merchant Marine in the future.
MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 192 3
This legislation was enacted, "to provide for the promotion and main-
tenance of the American merchant marine, and to repeal certain emergency
"-Samuel A. Lawrence, United States Merchant Shipping Policies and
Politics
,
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 39.
^CASL, The American Merchant Marine, Hero/ Stepchild, p. 4.
3U.S. Statutes at Large
,
Vol. 41, Part I, pp. 988-1008.
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legislation, and provide for the dispositon, regulation, and use of property
acquired thereunder ."
In conformance with this stated purpose, the Act addressed the prob-
lems created by the Shipping Act of 1916, by directing the Shipping Board to
determine required trade routes, provide ships to operate on these routes by
sale or charter, or if no private operators came forward, operate the routes
until such time as there were equitable bids for the ships. The Board was
also directed to be sure to get an honest price for the ships it controlled
and not just dump them on the market.
But perhaps the most important part of the Act was its statement of
policy, in which the attitude of the Government toward the Merchant Marine
was clearly spelled out for the first time. The policy as promulgated in
Section 1 of the Act is as follows:
"That it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper
growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall
have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of
vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve
as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency,
ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United
States to do whatevery may be necessary to develop and encourage the
maintenance of such a merchant marine . "^
Additional features of i_he Act provided for mail contracts to be let
to trade route operators, specified U.S. repair of American ships where
possible, and provided for loans for the construction of new ships. No direct
subsidies to private operators were provided for; "However, it included three
powerful indirect aids. First, the coastwise laws - tightened to eliminate
temporary wartime access afforded foreign vessels - were extended to include
distant island possessions. Second, upon a finding by the Shipping Board
that adequate U.S. flag service was available, existing preferential rates




2 Ibid'., p. 988.
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vesseiSo Third, the President was instructed to abrogate ail treaties which
restricted the right of the United States to impose descriminatory duties or
tonnage taxes. These latter two proposals were never implemented. "1
There were many problems, however, with the implementation and opera-
tion of the Act. The effects of the war were passing and the shipping boom
turned to bust. The Government was lucky to get $30 per ton in 1922 for ships
it had just built at a cost of over $200 per ton. This, in turn, made new
construction unattractive and, as a result, no ships were built under the
loan provisions of the Act. Further, the mail contracts were meager, poorly
administered, and did not provide the desired financial assistance.
The private operators had no experience in the management of large
fleets in competitive commercial trade and they could not match the skill of
their foreign competitors. In addition, most of the private operators were
undercapitalized and, to further aggravate the situation, there were many
instances of injurious rivalries and bidding wars between the various
companies vying for the trade routes.
MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 192 8 3
The purpose of this Act was to encourage the construction of new
shipping. To do this, it provided for two major authorizations. First, the
size of the construction loan fund, provided by the Merchant Marine Act of
1920, was increased to $250 million. This was done to encourage the pro-
curement of modern competitive ships to replace the aging and inefficient war-
time construction. Secondly, it expanded the authority to grant mail con-
tracts, in order to provide a method by which operators could accumulate
capital for ship construction, and as a means of circumventing the tradi-
•"-Lawrence, Shipping, Policies and Politics









tional congressional antipathy to direct subsidies. The budgetary climate in
this period was one of extreme hostility to any form of overt subsidy, so that
•mail contracts, at extremely liberal terms, were considered the only accept-
able expedient. "The mail contracts were intended to convey a hidden subsidy,
but in sufficiently modest amounts and under sufficiently ambiguous conditions
that congressional opposition to shipping subsidies would not be aroused."
The Act of 1928 did not, however, provide clear directions for the
awarding of the mail contracts nor for their administration. The Shipping
Board floundered around and ultimately lost control. Contracts were let and
payments were made without regard to the actual conditions which pertained on
any given route. As a result, some lines got much more than they needed while
others were not paid enough to allow them to compete adequately. In addition,
the loss of control by the Shipping Board, led to other abuses including
failure to meet the provisions of the ship replacement requirements, for which
purpose the contracts were really let, and in some cases, actual fraud.
Conditions got progressively worse, culminating finally in the estab-
lishment of a special Senate committee, chaired by Senator Hugo Black, which
conducted an investigation and held hearings from May 1933, until March 1934.
The results of the investigation are best expressed in the following quote
from the committee report:
"Private ownership of merchant and aerial transportation with govern-
ment subsidy has resulted in a saturnalia of waste, inefficiency, unearned and
exorbitant salaries and bonuses . Measured by results, the subsidy system,
as operated, has been a sad, miserable, and corrupting failure,"
The consequence of the obvious failure of the Act of 1928, to deal
adequately with the problems of our commercial shipping industry and the
speculation and peculation which its laxity fostered, led naturally to a
complete revamping of the entire structure of Government support.
•-Lawrence, Shipp ing, Poli cies and Politics
,
p. 43.
Aj.S. Congress, Senate, Investigation of Air Mail and Ocean Mail
Contracts
, S. Rept. 898, 74th Congo, 1st sess., 1935, pp. 39 and 40.
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There was one small glimmer of progress which emerged from the shambles,
Under the provisions of this Act and the Act of 1920, 58 sea going dry
cargo ships were built for the U.S. flag fleet, in the period 1928 to 1936.
^
This was by no means an adequate replacement program, but it was a start.
MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1936 2
This Act was the direct outgrowth of the national debate precipitated
by the Black investigations, and the gross mismanagement which they revealed.
The stated policy of the Act is as follows:
"It is necessary for the national defense and development of its
foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant
marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic waterborne commerce and a sub-
stantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of
the United States and to provide shipping service on all routes essential for-
maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all
times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of
war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United States
flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable, and (d)
composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels,
constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient
citizen personnel. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a
merchant marine." 3
It is interesting to note that despite the proven inadequacies of the pre-
vious procedures, the goals and objectives for the Merchant Marine remain
essentially identical with those espoused by the earlier legislation.
The Act was based on two key concepts and all of the actual operating
provisions were designed to support these concepts or were direct outgrowths
of them. First, the idea that there are certain essential trade routes which
must be serviced by U.S. flag shipping - the concept first appeared in the
Act of 1920 - was amplified and considerably strengthened. Secondly, it was
stated that U.S. flag lines should be able to compete on a par with foreign
U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Maritime
Subsidy Policy
,
(Washington, D.C.: Maritime Administration, 1954), p. 87.
(Mimeographed.
)






shipping over the same routes. This parity concept recognized the higher
building and operating costs which were incurred by U.S. operators and pro-
vided for subsidies to meet the situation. The overt subsidy was the major
break with past government policy.
To ensure proper execution and administration of these concepts, the
old Shipping Board, established by the Act of 1916, was disolved and a five
man Maritime Commission was created in its place. The previous ocean mail
contracts, with all their aura of government boon-doggeling, and specula-
tion, were also terminated. The Maritime Commission has since been expanded
and revamped to become the Federal Maritime Board, for policy decisions, and
the Maritime Administration, for policy and program implementation. However,
the Act, as it is currently written and amended, is essentially as it was
when first approved; the modifications having been more amplifications than
changes
.
The purposes and goals of the Act are carried out through:
"1. Construction-differential subsidies on vessels built in the
United States for use on essential foreign trade routes.
2. Operating-dif ferential subsidies on vessels used on essential
foreign trade routes.
3. Financial aid in the construction of vessels, either with or
without construction-differential subsidies, by deferment of a portion of
the purchase price (granting loans).
4. Applying an allowance of credit to the purchase price of new
vessels for obsolete vessels taken in exchange.
5. Restrictions on the sale or use of vessels owned or acquired by
the Maritime Administration.
6. Payment for national defense features incorporated in the
vessels.
7o Low interest rates on construction loans.
8. Establishment of reserve funds with attendant income tax benefits
to the vessels operators.
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9, Construction of vessels for chartering to private operators.
10. Additional subsidies to offset the effect of Governmental aid
paid to foreign competitors.
11. Guarantee of ship mortgages.
12. Training of citizens to serve on American merchant vessels.
13. Prescribing of minimum manning scales, minimum wage scales, and
minimum working conditions for all officers and crews employed on vessels
receiving an operating-differential subsidy, and other benefits to American
seaman.
14 o Authority to requisition or purchase vessels when advisable for
the security of the national defense or during national emergencies."
The construction and operating subsidies and the funding of national
defense features comprise the bulk of the payments under the Act and will,
therefore, be discussed at greater length.
CONSTRUCTION SUBSIDY
The construction-differential subsidy is intended to make it possible
for a ship operator to have new construction built in a U S. shipyard, for
approximately the same out of pocket costs as he would incur if building in
a foreign yard. The Government absorbs the difference between U.S. and
foreign building costs, up to 55 per cent of total cost, exclusive of
national defense features, based on a series of calculations which are not
particularly pertinent to this discussion.
This direct construction subsidy stimulated shipbuilding for the
private U.S. flag merchant fleet as soon as it became effective. By the
time the United States became a belligerant in 1941, 185 new ships built
o
under its provisions had been delivered. This modest beginning was com-
pletely overshadowed, however, by the tremendous wartime shipbuilding pro-
United States Comptroller General, Report on the Audit of the
Federal Mari t ime Board and the Maritime Administration
,
H. Doc. 93, 82nd
Cong., 1st sess. 1951, pp. Ill and 112.
^Committee of American Steamship Lines, Facts About Our American
Merchant Marine
,




gram. The total number of ships built by the Maritime Commission during the
national emergency, from 1939 to 1945, was 5601, totaling more than 54
million deadweight tons, at a cost of $13 billion. ' Additional shipyards
required to meet this mass demand for shipping construction capability cost
another $6 billion.
At the conslusion of the war there was more than enough shipping
available and therefore, construction under the provisions of the Act did not
resume until 1951.
Table VII, which follows, shows the amount of construction subsidy
paid by year, from 1951 through 1968 and also indicates the number of ships
being subsidized. The results of this program can be measured by the number
of ships which have been delivered and an analysis of their effect on the
size of private segment of the fleet. Table VIII, shows the number of
construction subsidy supported ships which were delivered in the period 1955
through 1968, and their capacity in deadweight tons. Table IX, shows the
active, privately owned segment, of the U„S. flag fleet for the period 1952
through 1968 and its associated capacity in deadweight tons.
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"The negative figure results from recapture of an overpayment in the prior
period.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Maritime Administration Annual-
Reports, 1951-1968
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It is evident from the foregoing tables that, in the last 15 years,
while the actual number of ships is declining, the building program has re-
placed almost 3 million tons of capacity while adding another 2 million tons.
And also, what is not immediately evident, is the fact that as a result of
new construction, the American Merchant Marine possesses over half of the
world's fastest cargo freighters.
NATIONAL DEFENSE FEATURES
Speed, as well as such requirements as additional compartmentation for
increased watertight integrity, rearrangement of machinery to lessen suscep-
tibility to battle damage, increased boom capacity, special added safety
devices, and gun mounts or foundations are paid for as national defense
2features. Table X, which follows, indicates the amount paid for these
national defense features in ships built under the Act, for the period 1951
through 1968.
••Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, The Expanding
Scope of Seapower
,
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The operating differential subsidy is paid for essentially the same
reason as the construction subsidy; to place the American ship operator in a
position where he can compete against cheaper foreign costs. While the sub-
sidy is paid to the operator, 80 per cent goes directly into crew's salaries;
U.S. wage scales, in some instances, being as much as ten times greater than
those of foreign competition. The computation of the subsidy amount is
extremely complex because it is based on percentages of foreign operating
expenses. In addition, this particular subsidy has a recapture feature which
requires the operator to return part of the payment, if more than a certain
percentage of corporate profit is realized. A complete description of the
subsidy calculations and the recapture criteria are not considered necessary
in this paper and, in fact, such a presentation would tend to distract atten-
tion from the actual subsidy payment.
Table XI shows the number of ships which were operated under the
operating subsidy feature of the Act, for the period 1951 through 1968, and
also indicates the net subsidy liability for each of these years. It indi-
cates that the number of ships kept on the essential trade routes by sub-
sidization has remained relatively constant, but that the cost of maintaining
these ships and routes is going up all the time. Obviously, some break-
through must be realized if this subsidy is not to become just a payment to











































TOTAL SUBSIDY LIABILITY 2,570.1




In addition to the subsidies and various other payments and benefits
which are provided under the Act of 1936, the Government has a policy of
cargo preference. This policy had its genesis in a 1904 law, which required
that all military cargo move in U.S. registry shipping, provided it was
available at reasonable rates.
Cargo preference is currently governed by Public Law 664, enacted in
1954, to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and it stipulates that at
least 50 per cent of all Government- sponsored cargo must be carried in U.S.
flag shipping to the extent that is available at fair and reasonable rates.
This law covers cargoes which are generated by Government agencies for:
(a) support for U.S. armed forces overseas,
(b) military aid and support for allies,
(c) economic assistance cargoes under the cognizance of Agency for
International Development,
(d) shipments made under Export-Import Bank Loans,
(e) Public Law 83-480 agricultural shipments.
The cost of this indirect subsidy is the difference between U.S. shipping
costs and the world market rate and has been estimated by the Maritime Admin-
istration as amounting to approximately $80 million annually. The effect of
this provision has been to keep many old and uneconomical ships in operation.
These ships generally belong to unsubsidized owners, who, with a few prom-
inent exceptions, have made no provision for replacement programs and are
thus being forced out of the industry.
In summary, the Government has rather lavishly supported the American
Merchant Marine, by a system of direct and indirect subsidies, as well as
1U S. Statutes at Large , Vol 33, Part I, p. 518.
^William H. Riordan, "Toward Modernization of the Merchant Marine"
(Unpublished Masters thesis, The George Washington University, 1966), p. 21.
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many other financial aids and benefits, but the actual growth resulting from
this aid has been minimal.

CHAPTER IV
NEW PROGRAMS AN]) PROPOSALS
Despite the picture of drift and unsuccessful pursuit of goals de-
picted by the facts and figures in the previous chapters, there are some
encouraging signs within the industry and the Federal Government.
THE INDUSTRY
The facts of American shipping life are not going to change; it will
always cost more to build ships in U.S. yards and to hire American seamen.
The U.S. shipping industry has at last come to realize this, and is trying
to meet the situation head on, and still beat its foreign competition in the
market place* By ingenuity, innovation, and a willingness to question old
methods and concepts, great strides are being made in efficiency of opera-
tions and most important, the savings generated by this increased efficiency
have begun to createhope and optimism in all segments of the industry.
The greatest single innovation has been the introduction of the con-
tainer concept by Malcolm McLean, the one-time trucking tycoon. "He got the
idea that if he could combine the go-anywhere flexibility of trucks with the
low cost of sea transportation, he could provide shippers with fast, safe,
and more economical distribution of their products."-'- In this total package
approach to shipping, standardized containers which can be moved by truck and
rail, as well as by ship, are loaded aboard specially designed cargo ships
for the transoceanic portion of their trip„ This innovation meant that the
items to be shipped could be packed into the container and sealed at the
point of origin, moved both overland and across the ocean to their port of
destination, and delivered unopened and undisturbed to the ultimate consignee,
•'-Ottenberg, "Crisis at Sea," Washington Star
,




The savings which accrue to boLh the ocean shipper and the ship owner
and operator using this method are dramatic.
The shipper now sees his goods loaded and sealed into what is really
a large steel security box. There is no reason for the original seal to be
broken until the container arrives at its ultimate destination. The security,
thus provided, has greatly reduced pilferage which previously ran as high as
ten per cent, of such cargoes as radios and liquors.
The introduction of the containers has also eliminated the expensive
overpacking and crating, which was required by the old break-bulk method of
shipping, and at the same time, damage to the goods while in transit has been
substantially reduced.
Finally, from the shippers point of view, the container concept has
revolutionized his bill of lading, follow up, and claims procedures. No
longer does he have to deal with a separate carrier for each different mode
of transportation required to deliver his merchandise to the customers. By
using a through bill of lading, the carrier which picks up the goods at the
loading platform takes responsibility for the shipment all the way to its
destination. Tracing actions, claims, and all the many other areas of
shipper-operator interface are made easier for both parties.
The ship owner and operator sees even greater operational improvements
and savings. The most important advance has been the tremendous reduction of
in-port time.
Ships earn money only when they are at sea, and traditionally, it has
been the assumption that in-port time would be 50 per cent of total voyage
time. Thus, at least half a ship's operational life could be considered to
to be unproductive. Further, any error in the estimate of the various por-
•l-Fredric C. Appel, "The Coming Revolution in Transportation,"
National Geographic
,
CXXXVI (September, 1969), p. 333.
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tions of voyage time was generally on the bad side, and in-port times were
longer than planned. In Vietnam, for instance, in-port time became so long
that it was frequently two or three times greater than the total at-sea time
for the round trip. Mien it is realized that it costs at least $5,000 a day
to keep an average cargo ship in port, the reduction of in-port time, made
possible by the use of containers, results in dramatic operational savings.
Containerships now plan on in-port time as being 15 per cent, or less, of
total voyage time. The contribution of the container to this great reduction
is the ease with which it can be handled and moved by largely automated cranes,
The cranes are installed as part of the ship or are included among the shore
facilities at most modern ports. Because of the fast turnaround time now
possible, the new American Lancer class ships of the U.S. Lines, make the
round trip between the East Coast and Europe every 21 days. With their speed
and efficiency and their large capacity, these ships can each replace 17
2
standard World War II freighters.
In addition to the reduction in turnaround time, the use of containers
has drastically reduced the costs of loading and unloading operations. The
automation, now possible, has greatly reduced the size of the stevedor gangs
required. As an example of the savings realized; it costs $15 per ton to
load or unload a ton of general cargo in the normal manner, in the Hawaiian
trade. When the cargo is containerized, the loading and unloading costs are
between 50 cents and $1 per ton.
The increased productivity of the containership concept has led to
other innovations which can be considered outgrowths of this breakthrough.
The first of these is the roll-on/roll-off (R0-R0) concept. In this tech-
Ottenberg, "Crisis at Sea," Washing ton Star
,
August 4, 1969, p. 5.
2
"U.S. Shipping," Business Week
,
p. 52.
-'Stanley Powell Jr., Chairman of the Board, Oceanic Steamship Co.,




nique, the ship is configured so that trucks drive all containers on and off
using their own trailers. In addition, all types of vehicles can be accommo-
dated and are loaded and unloaded under their own power. This does away with
the requirement for cranes entirely and makes possible even faster loading
and unloading. Using this RO-RO method, the Ponce de Leon, a 700 foot, 26
knot ship, in service between New York and San Juan, can be completely un-
loaded and reloaded with its cargo of 260, 40 foot trailers and more than 300
cars or trucks in as little as 8 hours.
A second innovation is the barge ship which carries its cargo in pre-
loaded floatable barges. There are several names which have been attached
to ships built to use this concept. Prudential and Pacific Far East Lines
call their' s LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship), while Lykes Bros. Steamship Company
call their' s SEABEES (Sea Barge Ships). The concept and technique is the
same, however, and these ships have several distinct advantages and show
great promise. Because the barges can be pre-loaded, they save time just as
do the containers, and because the ships load and unload themselves using
their own cranes, port requirements are at a minimum. Since the ships can
receive and discharge cargo in a harbor, and float their barges to and from
the port facility using tugs, docking charges all but disappear. The average
$5,000 a day charge to keep a conventional ship in port is reduced to approx-
imately $10.50, the cost of keeping a barge floating at a dock. In addition,
these ships make it much more economical to. service the many areas in the
world which lack the port facilities to adequately handle the average cargo
ship.
•*-"UoS. Shipping," Business Week
,
p. 52.
^Ralph E. Casey, Acting President American Institute of Merchant
Shipping, "Political and Economic Significance of the World's Merchant
Marines into the 1980' s," Naval War College Review
, XXI (April, 1969), p. 10.
^Ottenberg, "Crisis at Sea," Washington Star , August 4, 1969, p. 5.

44
And finally, unitization and containerization of cargo has led to a
bold new concept for the future; the Land Bridge. This is not a bridge over
land, but, "a land-link between two major, disconnected bodies of water which
are roughly opposite each other." 1 The link, in this case, would be a unit
train, shuttling back and forth between the ships in port on opposite sides
of the land barrier. The high utilization of the trains themselves, running
fully loaded in each direction, and the ease, speed, and low cost of the load
and unloading operations between the ships and trains, make the system eco-
nomically attractive and potentially cheaper than a complete sea voyage around
the continent,, There arc many problem areas which must be worked out, such
as; control of freight rates by the ICC, traffic routing, and the design and
procurement of specialized equipment,, If the system can be worked out and
it proves economical; "From a transportation point of view, the land bridge
could make the continental United States similar to a mountain pass which
would be the most economical route for a great deal of the world trade to
traverse. Control of this pass would present the United States with a lot of
options it doesn't have today."-'
These encouraging developments and the tremendous increases in pro-
ductivity which they have already provided, recently prompted Andrew E«
Gibson, the Maritime Administrator, to say;
"The revolution in technology puts American shipping at the
dawn of a new clipper- ship era. You have to go back to the days
of the clipper- ships to find a time with as much promise as this.
The U.S. is the leader in techniques. The American shipowner can
again make money, because he does it better than the competition
and not just because of his subsidy."^
George D. Saunders, "Land Bridge, From Sea to Shining Sea," United
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The Government too has taken a positive approach, and in October 1969,
•President Nixon announced a new maritime program designed to lead the way
into this new era for American shipping. It is intended to, " replace
the drift and neglect of recent years and restore this country to a proud
position in the shipping lanes of the world. "I
The program is conceived as a modernization and update of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, and as a challenge to all segments of the industry. It
further recognizes the current budgetary climate and the latent hostility in
Congress with regard to the payment of subsidies. Throughout the document,
the fiscal responsibilities of all parties, particularly the Government, are
stressed. The goals of the program are to; create opportunity and challenge,
provide better Government administration, and to reduce the dependence of the
industry upon Government subsidy while at the same time rebuilding our mer-
chant fleet.




The administration has designed this segment of the program to over-
come the twin problems of low production rates and high production costs
traditionally experienced by U.S. shipyards. These problems are caused by
the hand crafting of each ship to an individual design and the consequent
low relative labor productivity which is then added to the already higher
U.S. wage scales, making the yards non competitive. The plan envisions a
long-range building program, the introduction of standardized designs, and
the use of mass production techniques to cut costs by providing a stab] e








environment and by improving efficiency. It is hoped that the continuation
of a construction subsidy under these conditions, will not only make possible
the replacement of obsolete U.S. flag capacity, but will also allow the U.S.
shipbuilding industry to compete on the world market. The specific proposals
for the shipbuilding industry are as follows:
1. Make it possible to build thirty ships a year for the U.S C flag
fleet, vice the current level of ten.
2. Based on the provision of a long-term stable market, ultimately
reduce the maximum construction differential subsidy from 55 to 35 per cent.
The initial step would be a reduction to 45 per cent in fiscal year 1971 and
a subsequent reduction of two per cent a year until the maximum level is down
to 35 per cent.
3. Pay the construction subsidy directly to the builder instead of
through the shipowner which is the current practice.
4. Extend the multi-year procurement system to the shipbuilding in-
dustry as a means of providing a more stable environment which it is hoped
will lead to production efficiency and economies of scale.
5. Raise the ceiling on federally ensured mortgages from one to three
billion dollars.
6. Extend the construction differential subsidy to bulk carriers, a
segment of the industry which is not now covered by this subsidy.
7. Establish a commission which will report to the President on the
status of the shipbuilding industry.
SHIP OPERATING INDUSTRY
This portion of the program addresses the part of the industry which
has traditionally received the lion's share of the subsidy pie. The basic
idea behind this segment of the proposal is do away with the subsidization
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of inefficiency and provide incentive for improving operations, by allowing
the operator to keep the fruits of his cost reduction efforts. The specific
•proposals for the ship operators are as follows:
1. Eliminate subsidies for maintenance, repair and subsistance costs
and continue to subsidize only the higher U.S. wage and insurance costs. The
wage subsidy would be tied to a broad wage index involving several sectors of
the economy. The operator v/ould not then be paid for the exact difference in
seaman's wages nor would he lose subsidies when he made cost reductions.
2. Eliminate the recapture clause in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
which requires the operator to pay back certain profits above a given level.
This will provide an efficiency incentive and reduce Government administra-
tion costs,
3. Directly subsidize bulk carriers, which are not now covered by the
present aid, and eliminate many of the hidden support payments now provided
by premium freight rates.
4. Permit all operators in foreign trade, subsidized and nonsubsidiz-
ed, to defer tax payments on reserve funds set aside for well defined ship
replacement programs. Currently only operators receiving operating differ-
ential subsidy are granted this privilege.
5. Initiate a program of port renewal and modernization so as to re-
ceive the full benefits of the technological advances being experienced in
all fields of transportation.
LABOR
This segment of the program is more of an admonition than a specific
set of concrete proposals. It acknowledges the fact that previous Govern-
mental policies have not fostered good labor practices. It also recognizes
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that management and industry attitudes have not been as conducive to good
labor relations as might be expected. And finally, it alludes to the me-too-
ism of the many labor trades involved, which has resulted in disruptive work
stoppages while one union made sure it got what another had just received.
The specific comments in this area are:
1. Labor and management must take this opportunity to find ways to
solve their differences, without the disruptive work stoppages which have
characterized past maritime operations.
2. The expansion of the industry must be accompanied by equal
opportunity for employment for all minority groups.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
This last segment of the program would enlarge maritime research and
development which will be redirected to place greater emphasis on practical
application of technological advances and on coordination of Federal programs
with those of industry.
The program, as it currently stands, has met most of the problems of
the previous legislation, but it has also ignored the pet theories of some
segments of the industry and the problems of others. Chief among the ommis-
sions are the failure to authorize U.S. companies to build U.S. flag ships in
foreign shipyards and the failure to specifically address the problems of the
passenger liners and the Great Lakes operators.
Although the actual bill which will implement this new program has not
yet been sent to Congress, it is obvious that it will cost money. The
President himself acknowledged this when he indicated that subsidy expendi-
tures would not increase in fiscal year 1970, but would increase modestly






400 and 450 million dollars annually vice the 350 million dollar level for
fiscal year 1970. Despite the admitted rise in costs, the program, by pro-
viding incentives for increased efficiency, has dealt effectively with the
most irritating drawback of subsidies, namely, the tendency to have the
Government absorb the cost of inefficient methods and operations. It also
has some bite in it, for in addition to providing for the gradual reduction
of construction differential subsidies to a maximum of 35 per cent, it
specifically states that, "If the challenge is not met, the Administra-
tion's commitment to this part of our program will not be continued."
Further, the payment of the construction differential subsidies directly to
the builder, and the extension of these subsidies to cover previously un-
assisted portions of the industry, has improved the overall image of Govern-
merit aid in the eyes of prior opponents. Lastly, the extension of the
privilege of tax deferment, on reserve funds set aside for new construction,
to unsubsidized operators, has met the most pressing requirement voiced by
the leaders of that segment of the industry.
The budgetary prospects for the program appear to be excellent at
this moment, provided the necessary funding increases are, in fact, modest.
Representative Garmatz (D-Md.), Chairman of the House Merchant Marine Com-
mittee, praised the program and announced his support immediately after it
had been made public. Considerable support by other Congressmen of both
parties has also been expressed, and in addition, all segments of the in-
dustry and labor appear to be united in basic support of the program. De-
spite a certain slowness in the submission of the bill on the part of the
1 Ibid .
, p . 2
.
2
"U.S, Shipping," Business Week
,
p. 57.
-^Ottenberg, "Crisis at Sea," Washington Star , August 4, 1969, p. 5.




administration, there is a feeling that the various agencies will push it





The American Merchant Marine has been an unstable industry; at its
best, it has reached peaks rarely surpassed in creativity, productivity and
beauty -- "But is was in shipbuilding and shipping that the greatest triumphs
of early American industry and commerce were achieved --" ; at its worst it
has been an inefficient, backward, and poorly managed orphan, barely kept
alive by a vast network of special privilege and subsidy.
Two world wars, and numerous lesser crises, in the twenthieth century,
as well as, economic and purely patriotic considerations have been used to
prove the contention that the U.S must have a large, modern, and vigorous
merchant fleet if it is to meet it's commitments as a world leader. This
contention has now been accepted as a basis for public policy planning as
evidenced by the new program outlined by President Nixon. The program
appears to offer an excellent opportunity to achieve the desired ends. The
basic support of the industry, and broadly based and growing political
support, indicate a general agreement, on the part of those most directly
concerned, with the thrust and direction of the new program.
Obviously, there will be problems such as the ommission of specific
support for passenger liners. This segment of the fleet, in particular, is
in a very critical condition, with no U.S. flag ships now operating on the
prestigious North Atlantic run. The SS UNITED STATES, queen of the U.S.
merchant fleet, Atlantic Blue Ribbon holder, and our last ocean liner in re-
gular Atlantic service, has been recently laid up for an indefinite period.
The passenger ships, despite years of subsidy, have consistently lost money
1 Encyclopedia Britannica in Statement of Policy/Th e Navy League of the
United States
,




buL, because of the national image involved, there is sure to be a political
effort to save them.
This situation with the passenger liners also impinges on another area
of possible difficulty. Since these ships are labor intensive, they have
alv7ays been subject to labor problems. The maritime unions will do every-
thing possible to keep from losing the jobs represented by these ships. This
may help to counterbalance a very probable negative reaction by labor to the
new methods of computing the operating differential subsidy; which will be
based on the comparison of broad wage indexes instead of a direct job to job
relationship. The five years of relative labor peace, which is an absolute
requirement if the program is to achieve its goals, may be the. one stumbling
block which can not be overcome.
Another major area which has been totally ignored, are the problems of
Great Lakes shipping. This segment of the industry has long been left out of
general maritime legislation and may now be expected bo attempt to bring
enough pressure to bear to get some specific addressal of its problems.
Still, there are many signs of progress, with both the Government and
the industry contributing constructively to a new feeling of optimism. By
emphasizing the advancements' in shipbuilding techniques, and by breaking the
complete dependence of the builder upon the ship owner, both segments of the
industry can make progress by emphasizing their own objectives and best in-
terests. The improvement of Government- industry relations, and the attempt
to remove the Government from several areas of control and regulation,
should improve the management of the fleet. The unions also have shown a
more moderate approach and have been maintaining 'labor peace. In view of
these encouraging signs, it is entirely possible that the Merchant Marine
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can turn the corner and, " take its place once again among the vigorous,
competitive industries of this nation.'
All segments of the industry nov7 have the opportunity to take advant-
age of innovation, change, and an atmosphere of cooperation; perhaps for the
last time for many years. In the words of a spokesman of the house Merchant
Marine. Committee, "This is a long-range attempt to make the industry compet-
itive and the maritime industry is being told to fish or cut bait.'
''-U.S. President, Merchant Marine Press Release , p. 4,
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